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The practice of health diplomacy aims to prioritize the health care aspects of 
humanitarian aid as a mechanism for political economic negotiations between donor 
and recipient nations. Existing research concerning health diplomacy failed to 
assess the context-appropriateness of the health care aid transferred, the manner in 
which health diplomacy is implemented, and the political and economic ideologies 
embedded in such transfers. This paper examines how health diplomacy may be 
understood in terms of the above-mentioned criteria using specific illustrative 
examples of Sino-African health diplomacy over the past sixty years. China’s health 
diplomacy is contrasted with examples of that of the US in order to assess whether 
the former constitutes a distinct alternative to the normative health diplomacy of the 
global North.        
Introduction
This paper examines the historical trajectory of Sino-African health di-
plomacy from the Chinese Communist Party’s first health care transfers 
to African states in the 1960s to the present. Previous analyses of health 
diplomacy have predominantly focussed on health transfers from the 
global North to the global South. In general, the discourse of health di-
plomacy appears to assume that all such diplomacy follows a normative, 
Western paradigm and should be considered beneficent simply by virtue 
of the transfer of biomedicine. In contrast, by examining China’s health 
aid to African states this paper attempts to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of health diplomacy through an example of South-South 
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economic negotiations. In doing so, this paper analyzes if, and how, 
China’s health diplomacy is distinct from Western health diplomacy. 
More specifically, this paper critically assesses the political and eco-
nomic ideologies embedded in international health care transfers and 
the context appropriateness of the types of health aid transferred. By 
excluding these primary considerations, the existing health diplomacy 
literature has implied that all health care transfers are inherently be-
neficent and equivalent. The accuracy of such assumptions is problema-
tized in this paper.
Defining Health Diplomacy
Several definitions of health diplomacy can be identified in the literature.1 
In general, health diplomacy is defined as any health care activity charac-
terized by the underlying intention of improving political, economic, and/
or cultural ties between donor and recipient countries in keeping with the 
foreign policy of the donor state. Health diplomacy is an example of what 
Nye refers to as “soft power”,2 as health care aid is used to foster interna-
tional relationships and achieve foreign policy goals. 
Although health care transfers have historically been perceived as 
an inherently beneficent form of diplomacy, it is naïve to assume that all 
health diplomacy is conducted in the same manner and leads to the same 
outcomes in different recipient contexts. According to Adams, Novotny, 
and Leslie, “the most effective international health interventions are car-
ried out in an ethical manner that is sensitive to historical, political, so-
cial, economical, and cultural differences between nations and peoples.”3 
Hence, regardless of the donor’s intentions or the value of the particular 
health care intervention and/or technological transfer, context appropri-
ateness is a key consideration for effective health diplomacy.4 Though 
health care is often represented as a neutral scientific domain, political, 
economic, and cultural ideologies remain as embedded in international 
health aid as they are in domestic health care policies. Correspondingly, 
the range of activities falling under the rubric of health diplomacy should 
not be understood as a singular, unquestionably beneficent monolith. 
This point is highlighted by the following comparative and historical 
analysis of health diplomacy, which problematizes this universalizing 
conceptualization of health diplomacy.
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Some of the first instances of historical health diplomacy were the nine-
teenth century economic and trade policies relating to maritime quaran-
tines.5 The focus of these early international health relations concerned 
“international collaboration to protect human and commercial interests 
against the spread of particular infectious diseases.”6 However, these 
concerns were less a tool for engendering foreign relations than a means 
of preventing commercial interruptions. Similarly, the colonial legacy 
of international health can be categorised as “a protectionist response 
against the importation of foreign-born diseases or a medical defence 
for colonists, armies, and national commercial interests.”7 Early health 
diplomacy can also be identified in historical international missionary 
work that, despite its often-humanitarian practices, has served as a form 
of colonial control.8 In the post-wwii era, health interventions became 
an increasingly common aspect of international diplomacy through the 
creation of international development programmes and the growth of or-
ganizations such as the European Development Fund (1957), the United 
States Agency for International Development (1961), and, more recently, 
the uk’s Department for International Development (1997).9 Similarly, 
over the last hundred years, private philanthropic foundations have also 
played an integral role in health diplomacy. For example, in the early 
twentieth century, the Rockefeller Foundation used international health 
as a safe, irrefutable means by which to disseminate an American ideol-
ogy across the globe and “lay the foundation for American international 
dominance in trade.”10 Health diplomacy may thus contain coercive ele-
ments intended to foster a donor’s influence over recipient societies. 
As argued by Navarro, moreover, power differentials between states 
may be exacerbated through the transfer of high-technological and ex-
pensive medical equipment, which often result in a form of economic 
and knowledge-based dependency.11 Similarly, it is essential to question 
the absorptive capacities of recipient governments in managing health 
diplomacy. The larger the percentage of government spending supplied 
by external sources, the greater the chance that “a country may lose 
control of its priorities, programmes and strategies, yielding all control 
to the donors.”12 Hence, in order to safeguard state autonomy and sover-
eignty, it is crucial to incorporate the concept of recipient government 
ownership into health diplomacy. 
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Alternative Packaging?
China has a long, often unacknowledged history of providing foreign aid 
to Africa, building upon a common colonial experience to forge what 
China refers to as mutually beneficial partnerships.13 The overall amount 
of this contemporary aid is substantial. In 2009, China pledged a pack-
age which included supplying us$3 billion in soft loans and us$2 bil-
lion in subsidized credit to trade partners; establishing a us$5 million 
development fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa; 
forgiving the debt of the poorest countries that have diplomatic relations 
with China; opening the Chinese market to African products through 
the removal of customs duties on most goods; and opening economic 
and trade cooperation areas.14 At the 2012 Forum on China-Africa Co-
operation, China doubled its 2009 package, pledging us$20 billion to 
Africa over the next three years.15 This aid will: specifically target the 
development of infrastructure that facilitates trade within Africa; build 
agricultural technology centres; support the construction of wells; and 
train medical and other professional personnel.16 In 2009, China over-
took the United States to become Africa’s largest trade partner.17 If this 
trajectory continues, China is projected to overtake the World Bank as 
Africa’s most important financier.18 
Current health sector assistance constitutes more than a quarter of 
China’s foreign aid to Africa.19 Of the us$462 million 2006 Sino-Afri-
can assistance package, $126 million was specifically targeted for health 
care.20 Improving Africa’s public health has received particular empha-
sis from China. In 2006, four health-related priorities were identified, 
emphasizing: 1) the need to develop and promote effective treatments 
for malaria; 2) the exchange of medical personnel and information; 3) a 
commitment to disseminating medical teams and equipment to improve 
medical facilities and train more doctors throughout Africa; and 4) in-
creased technical support, including research exploring the potential of 
traditional herbs in treating and preventing hiv/aids.21 In late 2009, 
China pledged additional measures to strengthen Sino-African health 
cooperation, including plans to train 3,000 practitioners across Africa 
and a us$73.2 million assistance package, facilitating the construction of 
thirty hospitals and thirty malaria prevention and treatment centres.22
Although all donor countries imply their foreign policy and health di-
plomacy are motivated by the pursuit of mutual benefit for the donor and 
recipient, China’s intentions in Africa have been a source of particular 
criticism, especially from the West.23 Brautigam problematizes numerous 
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larly its presentation of aid as a mere mercenary attempt to exploit the 
natural resources of Africa.24 The accuracy of such an assertion is fun-
damentally challenged by the fact that many of the African countries re-
ceiving China’s health aid have no natural resources.25 Furthermore, the 
Chinese government has explicitly characterized their relationship with 
African countries as one of “mutual cooperation and benefit,” confront-
ing such accusations of harbouring a “hidden agenda.”26 Overall, China’s 
motivations for providing aid are likely similar to those of the US with 
respect to “strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit, and a reflection of 
the society’s ideologies and values.”27 But, as Brautigam notes, “China’s 
aid and economic cooperation differ [from traditional donors], both in 
their content and in the norms of aid practice.”28 For the purposes of this 
paper, however, the question of aid motivation is bracketed in favour of a 
greater emphasis on the manner in which health diplomacy is conducted 
and the outcomes of such practices. 
Practices of health diplomacy do not share a standardized, systema-
tized, or universalized ideology, meaning that not all health diplomacy 
is equivalent in terms of perceived appropriateness or effectiveness. The 
following sections thus analyse whether, and how, China’s health diplo-
macy differs from that of the West: a) ideologically; b) technologically, in 
terms of specific interventions and technological transfers; and c) struc-
turally, in terms of execution and implementation.
Ideology: An Alternative to Western International 
Development
China’s health diplomacy is undertaken in accordance with a particular 
ideological understanding of the function, structure and role of aid in dip-
lomatic relations, developed in the 1950s. In general, the ideologies that 
have become embedded in China’s foreign policy and health diplomacy 
derive from both Beijing’s particular political agenda and a distinctively 
“Asian” perspective on foreign policy. In April 1955, China and other 
developing countries began to establish both political and economic ties 
to Africa at a conference in Bandung, Indonesia.29 One of the primary 
outcomes of this conference was the development of a novel regional ap-
proach, that  was to become a normative ideology, characterizing Asian 
foreign policy and international cooperation, offering a marked alterna-
tive to the predominant Western ideology emanating from post-World 
War II reconstruction and the Truman Doctrine. 
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Coexistence.” The Five Principles, first articulated by China, India, and 
Burma, established the foundations of Chinese and Indian foreign pol-
icy, as well as Asian regional diplomacy in general, particularly within 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean).30 The Five Princi-
ples include: “1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
2) mutual non-aggression; 3) mutual non-interference in internal af-
fairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence.”31 
As the Five Principles apply to the conduct of all foreign policy, health 
diplomacy was to be similarly executed.32 
The ideological framework for Beijing’s foreign policy, however, 
extends beyond the Five Principles. For example, China has consist-
ently represented itself as a “natural ally of third world countries in the 
fight against imperialism and hegemony of the superpowers.”33 Unlike 
the Soviet Union, the Chinese government presented itself to African 
states as a patron that rejected the imperial mandates of Western pow-
ers and understood the unique struggles of peasant movements.34 China 
successfully characterized its relationships in Africa as equal, strategic 
partnerships—of similarly-developing “sister” countries—where mutu-
ally-beneficial cooperation replaced colonial paternalism.35  
In 1964, Zhou Enlai announced that Beijing’s policy toward sub-
Saharan Africa would be based on both the Five Principles and “Eight 
Principles of Economic Aid”: equality and mutual benefit; economic 
cooperation with respect for recipient’s independence; provision of in-
terest-free or low-interest loans; projects with low investment that could 
be accomplished in a timely manner; provision of quality equipment 
and resources at market prices; effective technical assistance; fees for 
experts set according to local standards; assistance in the development 
of recipient country’s self-reliance; and assistance with no conditions at-
tached.36 The idea that aid should not violate the recipient’s sovereignty, 
and offered without conditionalities, has remained the cornerstone of 
China’s foreign aid practices.
Furthermore, unlike the numerous political and economic condi-
tionalities historically imposed on governments by, for example, the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, no such conditionali-
ties have been attached to China’s loans to African countries. (Indeed, 
many African debts to China have been forgiven. In 2000, 2003, and 
2006, us$1.2 billion for thirty-one African countries; us$750 million; 
and us$1.3 billion were forgiven respectively.37 However, to categorize 
China’s policy as entirely free of conditionalities is not accurate. In order 
to be considered for Chinese aid, states have been obliged to support 
the “One China” policy, wherein the Republic of China (Taiwan) is not 
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within a discourse of “no strings,” China has successfully presented itself 
as a natural ally of low-income countries, and enhanced its credibility 
amongst African governments.39 
Technology: Specific Health Diplomacy Interventions
In addition to these ideological differences, the actual health care in-
terventions and structure of health diplomacy further differentiate Chi-
nese and Western health diplomacy. In order to distinguish the actual 
health care practices that have been transferred from China to African 
contexts, unstructured interviews were conducted in Beijing with ap-
proximately thirty Chinese and African stakeholders, in conjunction 
with archival research. The majority of interviews were conducted at 
the “Third International Roundtable on China-Africa Health Collabora-
tion” in Beijing, from June 12 to June 13, 2012. 
The particular interventions and technology transferred from China 
to Africa have markedly differed from those transferred by the West. 
Professional human resources have always been a central component 
of Sino-African health diplomacy. For example, “since the first medical 
team arrived in Algeria in 1964, more than 15,000 Chinese medical 
personnel have served in fourty-seven different African states and treat-
ed at least 180 million patients.”40 Historically, Chinese Medical Teams 
(cmts) have been specifically targeted for rural, under-served communi-
ties41 with limited access to health care.42 cmts are also noteworthy for 
including practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine (e.g. acupunctur-
ists and herbalists), in addition to conventional biomedical personnel.43 
According to several informants, distinctly “Chinese” health care 
transfers appear to have been particularly appropriate for local recipi-
ent contexts in Africa, and are well utilized by local communities.44 For 
example, Chinese herbal remedies were welcomed in most African com-
munities, where many local informal health care economies are domi-
nated by herbal use.45 Additionally, the Chinese herb Artemesia annua 
provides the starting compound for artemisinin-combination therapies,46 
which have proved particularly successful in treating malaria and are 
endorsed by the World Health Organisation.47 
In addition to human resources, essential medicines, herbs, and 
acupuncture, China has also been integral in the development of health 
care infrastructure, both through the construction of hospitals and clin-
ics throughout Africa and in the on-going training of African medical 
students in China.48 According to interviewed informants, these health 
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nary Africans and engendered a trust in Chinese medical products.49 
Furthermore, preliminary evidence from interviews and the literature 
suggests a general satisfaction with the outcomes of China’s particu-
lar health diplomacy in Africa. For example, upon visiting a number 
of medical clinics sponsored by the Chinese government throughout 
the continent, it became clear to one researcher that rural cmts rep-
resented one of the most successful forms of current aid to Africa.50 
The Chinese medical teams were noted for focusing on disseminating 
basic preventative care to rural areas previously lacking proactive public 
health care.51 Sustainable health care development is thus promoted in 
recipient countries’ health care infrastructure through the creation of 
horizontal primary health care programmes, as opposed to the singular 
focus on vertical programmes for specific disease eradication, as com-
monly practised in Western health diplomacy.
This contrast illustrates that such interventions cannot accurately 
be considered independent of their ideological framework. Political, 
economic, and cultural ideologies embedded within health diplomacy 
interventions are as relevant to outcomes in local health care systems 
and population health as the intervention itself. Introducing high-tech-
nological health care transfers that are predominantly accessible to elites 
in metropolitan areas, for instance, may subsequently require a greater 
allocation of state health care resources to be redistributed toward invest-
ment in urban hospitals. The health care budget, resources, and access 
available for more rural, and often poorer, populations are thereby re-
duced. Hence, technological transfers that are inappropriate for a given 
context have the potential to increase disparity and inequity. It is thus 
imperative to consider these factors in order to improve local health care 
systems and population health. 
Structure: Partnerships in Chinese Health Diplomacy
There are also inherent structural differences between Chinese and West-
ern health diplomacy. Whereas Western health assistance comes from a 
combination of public, private, and multilateral sources, China’s health 
diplomacy is almost entirely public in nature, and often decentralized to 
the level of a Chinese province. Typically, a Chinese province is paired 
with one or more African countries.52 Although the Chinese central gov-
ernment negotiates health aid with African states, the implementation of 
health diplomacy, generally through the deployment of cmts, is carried 
157out by individual provinces.53 According to the Director-General of the 
Department of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Health of 
China, this decentralized structure facilitates better recruitment of medi-
cal personnel and reduces logistical problems.54 
Furthermore, the process of health diplomacy is typically initiated 
by the prospective recipient government. One informant from China 
noted, “If they don’t ask, we don’t provide.”55 In general, an African 
government will propose a health project in accordance with their as-
sessment of the needs of their population. Hence, if the recipient gov-
ernment is seeking cmts, they will specify what kind of practitioners 
and specialists they require, and where they wish them to work. The 
Chinese government then assesses whether it can fulfil the demands of 
the proposal in terms of human and material resource availability.56 As 
a result of this structure, interventions are commonly recipient-led from 
the onset. They are thus more context-appropriate than if China was to 
devise a health care intervention according to its own estimation of lo-
cal need.57 The greater specificity of this process could serve to inform 
Western health diplomacy.58 
China’s health diplomacy is structurally distinct not only in terms 
of planning, but also in implementation. Chinese medical teams travel 
as a cohesive group, typically consisting of twenty members, who work 
together in a single medical facility for a minimum of two years.59 Fur-
thermore, China’s health interventions are also distinguished by the 
overall time commitments allotted to projects. Health interventions from 
the West are usually of a specific duration, and often lack a follow-up 
from which sustainability can be assessed. Brautigam observes: “For the 
West, once a project ends, it is turned over to the government, and donor 
involvement usually ends.”60 One outcome of the “Western approach” is 
that even if projects have fulfilled the donors’ specific short-term goals, 
many are unsustainable in the long term. However, both Chinese and 
African informants report that China will usually maintain a project 
until it may be viably assumed by the recipient government.61 Addition-
ally, follow-ups were considered common, particularly in the case of 
hospitals in need of repair.62
Overall, then, the type of health interventions that China delivers 
and the manner in which these interventions are carried out may be 
considered distinct from those of the West. To further illustrate the ways 
in which the type of health care transfer, manner of delivery, and under-
lying ideology can impact recipient health care, the paper turns to the 
case of Chinese and us hiv/aids health diplomacy.
158 China and US HIV/AIDS health diplomacy in Africa: 
A Comparative Case Study
African countries represented seventy-six per cent of the 2.1 million 
deaths due to hiv/aids in 2007.63 These deaths were not believed to 
be a consequence of a lack of viable anti-retroviral (arv) therapies, but 
rather due to a lack of accessible and affordable arv pharmaceuticals.64 
It is estimated that the cost of arvs would need to be reduced by as much 
as ninety-five per cent in order to be accessible to all populations.65 
Unfortunately, as a result of the 1994 World Trade Organization 
(wto) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement 
(trips), the cost of hiv/aids pharmaceuticals is far beyond the income 
of the average citizen in a low- or even middle-income country.66 Under 
trips, a generic product cannot be registered without the patent holder’s 
agreement for the life of the patent, which can last up to twenty years.67 
This policy has been criticized as a globalization of us patent law for the 
sole benefit of us and European transnational pharmaceutical corpora-
tions.68 trips and us hiv/aids policies can be understood as reflections 
of the so-called Washington Consensus, which is grounded in Western 
notions of political liberalization and economic reform—such as the radi-
cal neo-liberalization of markets and the privatization of public goods.69 
As a result of the Doha Declaration of the Fourth wto meeting in 2001, 
developing countries can override drug patents by issuing compulsory 
licenses to manufacture or import cheaper versions of a pharmaceutical 
product, if a national health emergency can be justified.70 It is specified, 
however, that such a compulsory license would need to “be authorised 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorising such use.”71 Therefore, countries lacking domestic pharma-
ceutical industries—which includes almost all African countries—do not 
have the sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce significant quanti-
ties of generic pharmaceuticals. 
China joined the wto a month after the Doha declaration was en-
dorsed, but strongly sided with developing countries in criticizing trips 
and its addendum as perpetuating an imbalance in the rights and obliga-
tions of developing countries.72 China argued that public health rights 
should take priority over intellectual property rights in government 
decision-making.73 Additionally, China had already been active in the 
African pharmaceutical sector for over three decades, developing phar-
maceutical factories in the 1970s that produced drugs for local use in 
“Zanzibar, Mali, Cote d’ Ivoire, Kenya, Egypt, and Sudan.”74 
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tical ingredients (apis).75 According to a Chinese informant, low profit 
margins and regulatory barriers to the production of generic arvs have 
resulted in a primacy focus of Chinese pharmaceutical companies on the 
production of apis rather than generic arvs.76 Informants identified 
that currently eighty per cent of Africa’s arvs are imported from India, 
and eighty per cent of the apis needed for India’s arv production comes 
from China.77 In recognizing the capacity of the Chinese pharmaceutical 
industry to supply generic arvs, the joint United Nations Programme on 
hiv/aids (unaids) is currently working with the government of China 
to establish policies that would incentivize Chinese companies to pro-
duce generic arvs for Africa.78 China is also in the process of developing 
an alternative to over-dependence on arvs. There has been a marked 
interest among a number of African governments in collaborating with 
China on research exploring the use of African herbal medicines to treat 
hiv/aids.79 The goal would be to generate sustainable cost-effective hiv/
aids treatments that offer a viable alternative to cost-prohibitive arvs, 
and the many issues noted with generic arvs production.80 
Yet, beyond political-economic ideological differences in hiv/aids 
health diplomacy stemming from the divergence between the Washington 
Consensus81 and China’s economic development model of “a long-term 
pragmatic strategy, emphasising sustainability and equality, with the 
ultimate objective of self-determination” (or the Beijing Consensus)82—
it is also possible to consider the effect of us Christian fundamentalist 
ideology on the policies of the us hiv/aids programme known as the 
President’s Emergency Plan for aids Relief (pepfar). pepfar, though 
providing the single greatest monetary donation to hiv/aids organiza-
tions in Africa for counselling, prevention, and treatment, is also re-
plete with conditionalities for African hiv/aids patients that may result 
in different outcomes depending on context. pepfar policy has been 
criticized for insisting that arf therapies be made available only to those 
individuals willing to abstain from sex and to those organizations that 
counsel abstinence and refuse to distribute condoms.83 
In interviews, informants from local-level African ngos stated that 
pepfar’s demands were unrealistic and counter-productive, often ex-
acerbating the social stigma affiliated with aids in local settings and 
potentially serving to increase the rate of hiv infection via the infeasibil-
ity of insisting on abstinence from sex as an effective intervention.84 Fur-
thermore, a country’s eligibility to receive the substantial benefits from 
pepfar is contingent upon their compliance with trips.85 Thus, health 
diplomacy that contains conditionalities that are inappropriate for a giv-
160 en context may result in deleterious outcomes, thus problematizing the 
normative understanding of health diplomacy as inherently beneficent.
Population perceptions can provide a useful means by which to assess 
health diplomacy. In 2007, the Pew Trust conducted public opinion polls 
throughout Africa.86 This research found that China was perceived as having 
both a more positive than negative impact on African countries in general, 
and a more positive impact in Africa overall than the United States in all 
African countries surveyed, except South Africa.87 These perceptions may 
be a result of the particular interventions experienced (e.g. pepfar, which 
was fully implemented by June 2004) and/or may be related to the perceived 
asymmetry of power between African recipients and the United States. Ac-
cording to Gergen and Gergen: ‘‘when a state appears to be highly affluent, 
its aid is less impressive to the recipient.”88 However, the Pew Trust findings 
can be criticized for making statements from highly aggregated averages of 
the data. Informants interviewed for this paper had numerous criticisms of 
China’s work in Africa. For example, one African informant reported that 
“the general opinion is that Chinese products and China’s work are of low 
quality.”89 Additional challenges to Sino-African health diplomacy are iden-
tified in the following section.
Identified Challenges to Sino-African Health 
Diplomacy
Conditionalities and State Sovereignty
Technical support, without political “strings attached”—beyond the 
aforementioned agreement on the “One China” policy—has remained 
a significant aspect of China’s support for African states.90 That said, 
though China’s current policy of non-interference in sovereign states has 
earned the respect of African leaders, it has consistently received the 
condemnation of the West for inadvertently perpetuating abuses to hu-
man rights through “blind funding.”91 Similarly, it may be asked whether 
the requirement of agreeing to a “One China” policy should be catego-
rised as non-interventionist. 
It must be recognized, however, that not all conditionalities have 
the same potential to undermine state sovereignty. Tull suggests that 
China offers “an attractive alternative to Western governments who un-
dermine the sovereignty of African governments by attaching develop-
mental assistance to reform programmes, such as structural adjustment 
programmes and democratic reforms.”92 According to Thompson, China 
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and investment in infrastructure and social institutions without demand-
ing particular political or economic reforms.93 Beijing’s patent rejection 
of the unpalatable aspects of neoliberal development, such as economic 
“shock therapy”94 or radical economic and political reform, has made 
China a welcome partner throughout Africa.95 Thus, agreeing to “One 
China” may be considered far less disruptive to state sovereignty than 
particular economic reforms.
True Sustainability
Attention to the sustainability of health projects has been identified as a 
strength of Sino-African health diplomacy. And yet, the manner in which 
China attempts to ensure sustainability may also potentially compromise 
it. The sustainability of Sino-African health diplomacy can be analyzed 
and critiqued in several ways, beginning with the locations where cmts 
are deployed. Many African countries experience a rural to urban “brain 
drain.” African physicians and medical staff who do not want to work in 
rural areas are conveniently replaced by cmts. The cmts may thus be 
understood as facilitating this rural human resource migration by mak-
ing it appear that African governments do not need to seek long-term 
solutions or create incentives for African health workers to work in rural 
areas. This situation was reinforced by the Chinese Minister of Health’s 
announcement at the Third International Roundtable on China-Africa 
Health Collaboration that cmts would remain in Africa for “as long as 
they are needed.”96 The prospect may thus be raised that Sino-African 
health diplomacy may be inadvertently thwarting the development of a 
sustainable solution to rural health care disparities in African states. Even 
more so, it is questionable whether the continual provision of Chinese 
human resources, without the transfer of necessary knowledge to local 
levels is actually facilitating the sustainability that Beijing advocates, or is, 
in fact, creating a permanent dependency on China. 
These issues of sustainability may, at least in part, result from a lack 
of focus on the effectiveness of knowledge transfer in Sino-African health 
diplomacy. For example, many informants noted that true sustainability 
may be compromised by culture and language.97 Significant language bar-
riers were identified as detrimental to the sustainability of programmes. 
One informant noted that in a project in Zambia, instructions for medical 
equipment were often written in Mandarin, rendering it inoperable for lo-
cal recipients.98 Furthermore, although several Chinese informants iden-
tified predominant issues in the ability of Africans to maintain projects, it 
was also observed that mechanisms to foster the transfer of management 
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were seriously lacking.99 Neither were there necessarily smooth trans-
fers between the Chinese staff itself, as one informant identified gaps in 
transitions between old and new medical teams as an issue.100 Moreover, 
although cmts were reported to meet annually in China, it is not clear if 
the experiences of cmts and other Chinese participants in health diplo-
macy are ever utilized to render more effective interventions. Almost all 
informants lamented the lack of project evaluations.101 
China’s domestic needs were also identified as a potential threat to 
the sustainability of Sino-African health diplomacy. Firstly, pressures on 
China’s health care system, and the outcome of current health reforms, 
may prevent provinces from being able to deploy medical teams through-
out Africa. Health reforms in China have resulted in marked domestic 
health care disparities, especially, ironically, with respect to human re-
sources in rural China.102 Such limitations began to surface when, in 
2006, China offered to send medical teams to Africa to the “extent it 
could.”103 In 2007,  approximately 4,000 general medical practition-
ers were working at community hospitals in China, yet the government 
estimated that a minimum of 160,000 additional medical personnel 
were required to meet China’s domestic medical needs.104 Furthermore, 
provinces are finding it more difficult to assemble medical teams, due to 
a dearth of volunteers willing to leave their families for a period of two 
years to be paid the equivalent of local African wages.105 Thus, in combi-
nation with finite medical resources available and a dearth of cmt vol-
unteers, increased domestic demands for health care have the potential 
to significantly compromise China’s ability to send medical personnel to 
Africa in the future. 
According to informants, sustainability is also being threatened by 
the growing presence of unregulated private Chinese doctors, acupunc-
turists, and herbalists in Africa, acting as non-state actors and potentially 
interfering with state-driven health diplomacy. Private Chinese medical, 
acupuncture, and herbal practitioners have aggressively entered the in-
formal health care economy of many African cities, and are reportedly 
affecting the cost of, and access to, health care.106 One informant from 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, reported that acupuncture and Chinese herbs 
were found in urban areas, and though herbs were identified as espe-
cially popular, they were also often expensive.107
Finally, sustainability has also been compromised by China’s reluc-
tance to engage with local ngos and other representatives of civil so-
ciety, by virtue of its adherence to principles of non-interference with 
governments and the various internal social factions of countries.108 
Interestingly, the intended beneficence of adhering to non-interference 
163could ultimately thwart sustainability precisely because civil society must 
be engaged in order to engender sustainable interventions.
Structure 
Sino-African health diplomacy can also be critically assessed in terms of 
structure. The same structure that is so distinct from that of the West is also 
open to critique. Health care systems are complex and require an holistic 
analysis, meaning that the effectiveness of a health care system is brought 
into question when projects are not assessed in conjunction with former and 
current ones. Chinese informants revealed that projects are often planned 
in a haphazard manner and are, as mentioned, never evaluated.109
Furthermore, a significant strength of historical Sino-African 
health diplomacy has been its horizontal structure focusing on building 
infrastructure and establishing primary and preventative health care. 
However, informants note that China’s horizontal focus is currently 
being compromised by collaborations with Western states, ingos and 
multilateral agencies that insist on a more vertical approach to health 
care.110 One informant observed that “previously aid from China did not 
value cooperation with ngos and other governments.”111 And yet, the 
Third International Roundtable on China-Africa Health Collaboration 
appeared to be dominated by organizations such as The Gates Foun-
dation, usaid, and dfid. “We want closer collaboration with who 
and other organizations,” offered one Chinese informant.112 Evidence 
for this development can be found in the growing focus on health di-
plomacy projects directed toward, for example, malaria and hiv/aids 
treatment. These distinctively vertical programmes do not effectively 
strengthen health care systems in general. 
Interestingly, this shift toward more Western programming is ac-
companied by a parallel shift in political economic ideology clearly evi-
dent in many of the speeches presented by Chinese representatives at 
the Third International Roundtable on China-Africa Health Collabora-
tion. One Chinese informant argued: “Our assistance to Africa has been 
a public economy...we should tap into liberal markets and the private 
sector.”113 It remains to be seen if what has appeared to be a marked alter-
native to Western health diplomacy will eventually merge with the West-
ern approach. And yet an African informant representing the African 
Union asked, “How do we move away from silos [sic] of interventions 
and begin to address weak health systems?”114 It is doubtful whether her 
query will be heard by a China seemingly-eager to forge alliances with 
Western health and development organizations.
164 Conclusion: Not All Health Diplomacy is Equal
Although Brautigam argues that “China’s engagement in Africa often 
simply repeats patterns established by the West, and especially Japan 
in China,” the Chinese have added their own interpretation to devel-
opment practices in disseminating what “they believe worked for their 
own development”.115 This paper has demonstrated that China’s health 
diplomacy in Africa does offer an alternative to Western (or North-South) 
health diplomacy, particularly with respect to the structure of health in-
terventions; the specific kind of interventions; the outcomes of interven-
tions; and the ideological framework underlying such health diplomacy.
Until now, the literature on health diplomacy has been almost singu-
larly concerned with its intentions. However, as illustrated in this paper, 
the intentions of health diplomacy may not be as relevant to health care 
systems and population health as the practices being implemented; how 
they are implemented; and the actual outcomes of such practices. Ad-
ditionally, any purported beneficence of health diplomacy must be justi-
fied with respect to the appropriateness of a particular form of health 
diplomacy for a given local context. Though somewhat counter-intuitive, 
preliminary research indicates that “low tech” health care transfers from 
China may yield more successful outcomes in local African contexts than 
higher tech Western transfers, primarily due to the context appropriate-
ness of the technology and the corresponding emphasis on building local 
health care infrastructure. 
Further assessments and comparisons of these different approaches 
will identify the strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby providing an 
evidence base from which health diplomacy can produce increasingly 
positive and sustainable outcomes for health care systems and recipient 
populations. In this manner, donors may begin to learn from one an-
other. Future research should consider the lessons to be learned from 
China’s experience in health diplomacy (as well as other examples of 
South-South health diplomacy) with the aim of informing future prac-
tice. Interestingly, representatives from the WHO, World Bank, and the 
Gates Foundation have praised China’s programmes for their positive 
contributions to African development.116 On China’s part, as one Chinese 
informant stated, “We are willing to learn from other countries, from 
their work in Africa.”117 Going forward, these differing approaches to 
health diplomacy need not remain in opposing camps. 
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